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1
UCL DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY
Module Name: International Political Economy
Module Code: PUBL0004
Teaching: 10 hours of lectures, 10 hours of seminars
Credits: 15
Assessment: 1,000 word essay, 2,000 word coursework
Essay Deadline/s: Essay: Monday, 22nd February 2021 (before 2pm)
Coursework: Monday, 26th April 2021 (before 2pm)
Lecturers: Dr Michael Plouffe, Dr Conrad Copeland, and Dr Lauge Poulsen
Office Hours: Available on Moodle through SPPBook (enrolment key: sppbook) or by appointment.
Useful Links
UCL Timetable
Extenuating Circumstances
Essay Extensions
Penalties for Late Submission
Penalties for Overlength Essays
Essay Submission Information
Examinations
Plagiarism and TurnItIn
Plagiarism and Academic Writing - a Guide for Students (you will need to log in and enrol yourself on the page)
2
PUBL0004: International Political Economy
Dr. Michael Plouffe, Dr. Conrad Copeland, and Dr. Lauge Poulsen
Emails: michael.plouffe@ucl.ac.uk, conrad.copeland@ucl.ac.uk; and l.poulsen@ucl.ac.uk
Course Objectives
This course introduces students to the study of international political economy (IPE), focusing on
international trade and foreign investment. We discuss and critically assess critically recent theories and
evidence on which political, economic, and legal factors enable and constrain the global trade and
investment regimes. There are no prerequisites for this class.
Organization of Teaching
The course is taught through weekly recorded lectures and live online seminars.
The lectures will be dedicated to introducing broad theories and concepts, providing historical overviews
of each week’s topic, looking at relevant data, and raising questions for further discussion in the seminars.
The lectures are designed to provide sufficient background for more detailed and fruitful group
discussions.
The seminars will cover each week’s topic in detail. The object of the seminar is to facilitate student
participation and interaction as well as broaden students’ understandings of the issues and debates
introduced in the lectures. Students will be expected to demonstrate an understanding of the relevant
theories and concepts and apply these theories to particular policy domains.
Assessment Criteria
For the 2020-2021 academic year, students will be assessed by two equally weighted written assignments.
Detailed guidelines and expectations will be distributed during the term. The essays must be double-
spaced, have numbered pages, be correctly and consistently referenced, and include a bibliography.
A note on plagiarism. Cheating and plagiarism are unacceptable. Students caught committing either of these
breaches of conduct will be subject to the disciplinary procedures detailed in the University Handbook.
Students should consult the Handbook for a comprehensive description of academic dishonesty.
Students with any questions should seek clarification prior to submission of work.
3
Course Outline
A note on the readings. Students are expected to read each item listed under required and very strongly
encouraged to read widely among the suggestions for further readings. Suggestions for background readings
are also occasionally provided. The minimum expectation is four articles/chapters per week (in
other words, the required readings are not always sufficient) but a good performance in the
course requires significant engagement the further readings as well. Some changes to the reading
list may be made during the term. However, sufficient notice will always be provided (no less than one
week).
Students are encouraged (but not required) to buy:
The following three books are recommended (but not required):
Clark, Gregory. 2007. A Farewell to Alms: A Brief Economic History of the World (Princeton:
Princeton University Press).
Frieden, Jeffry. 2006. Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century (New York:
Norton)
Oatley, Thomas. 2012. International Political Economy, 5/E. (New York: Pearson-Longman),
The following two on intellectual history are recommended (but not required):
Irwin, Douglas. 1996. Against the Tide: An Intellectual History of Free Trade (Princeton:
Princeton University Press).
Sally, Razeen. 1998. Classical Liberalism and International Economic Order (London:
Routledge).
The following book is useful (but not required) for a general supporting text on international economics:
Krugman, Paul, Maurice Obstfeld, and Marc Melitz. 2014. International Economics, 10/E. (New
York: Pearson).
4
Part I: Political economy foundations
Week 1: Current events and international political economy
Week 2: Economic foundations of international trade
Week 3: Trade preferences
Week 4: Trade institutions
Week 5: Trade in services and foreign investment
Part II: Political economy of regulation
Week 6: Regulating trade
Week 7: Regulating goods trade
Week 8: Regulating services trade
Week 9: Regulating foreign investment
Week 10: Dispute settlement
5
Week I: Current events and international political economy
What is international political economy? We briefly introduce the field and discuss current events through the analytical lens
of IPE.
Required reading:
Gruszczynski, Lukasz. 2020. The COVID-19 Pandemic and International Trade: Temporary Turbulence
or Paradigm Shift?. European Journal of Risk Regulation, 11(2), pp.337-342.
Kwan, Chi Hung. 2020. The China–US trade war: Deep‐rooted causes, shifting focus and uncertain
prospects. Asian Economic Policy Review, 15(1), pp.55-72.
Lake, David A. 2009. Open economy politics: A critical review. Review of International Organizations, 4(3),
pp.219-244.
Owen, Erica and Stephanie Walter. 2017. 'Open economy politics and Brexit: Insights, puzzles, and ways
forward.' Review of International Political Economy 24(2).
Further reading:
Adams, Stephen, 2016. The future of UK trade policy: the case for regulatory diplomacy. 9th September,
global-counsel.co.uk.
Borchert, Ingo. 2016. Services trade in the UK: What is at stake? UKTPO Briefing Paper 6.
Farrell, Henry and Abe Newman. 2017. 'BREXIT, voice and loyalty: rethinking electoral politics in an
age of interdependence.' Review of International Political Economy 24(2).
Itakura, Ken. 2020. Evaluating the impact of the US–China trade war. Asian Economic Policy Review, 15(1),
pp.77-93.
Holmes, Peter, 2016. 'Roos and rules: Why the EEA is not the same as membership of the Single
Market.' UKTPO Briefing Paper 3.
Springford, John and Samuel Lowe, 2018. Britain’s services firms can’t defy gravity, alas. Centre for
European Reform.
6
Week II: Economic foundations of international trade
What are the characteristics of international trade in the 21st century? Why do countries engage in international trade and
what are the basic costs and benefits?
Required Reading:
Bannerman, Gordon. 2015. ‘The Free Trade Idea,’ In: Lisa Martin (ed.) The Oxford Handbook on the
Political Economy of International Trade. New York: Oxford University Press.
Bernard, A.B., Jensen, J.B., Redding, S.J. and Schott, P.K., 2007. Firms in international trade. Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 21(3), pp.105-130.
Bown, Chad. 2015. ‘Trade Policy Instruments Over Time.’ In: Lisa Martin (ed.) The Oxford Handbook
on the Political Economy of International Trade. New York: Oxford University Press.
Chapter 11 in: Albert Park, Gaurav Nayyar, and Patrick Low. Supply chain perspectives and issues.
Geneva: WTO, 2013.
Further Reading:
Barin, Samuel. 2015. ‘Trade and Environment.’ In: Lisa Martin (ed.) The Oxford Handbook on the
Political Economy of International Trade. New York: Oxford University Press.
Manger, Mark and Kenneth Shadlen. 2015. ‘Trade and Development. In: Lisa Martin (ed.) The Oxford
Handbook on the Political Economy of International Trade. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Pavcnik, Nina. Globalization and within-country inequality, In: Marc Bacchetta and Marion Jansen, eds.
Making Globalization Socially Sustainable. Geneva: WTO and ILO, 2011.
7
Week III: Trade preferences
How do trade’s effects contribute to policy preferences? What other factors influence the formation of preferences and their
configuration in the aggregate?
Required Reading:
Baker, Andy. 2005. ‘Who Wants to Globalize? Consumer Tastes and Labor Markets in a Theory of Trade
Policy Beliefs.’ American Journal of Political Science 49(4): 924-938.
Kuo, Jason and Megumi Naoi. 2015. ‘Individual Attitudes.’ In: Lisa Martin (ed.) The Oxford Handbook
on the Political Economy of International Trade. New York: Oxford University Press.
Plouffe, Michael. 2015. ‘Heterogeneous Firms and Trade-Policy Preferences.’ In: Lisa Martin (ed.) The
Oxford Handbook on the Political Economy of International Trade. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Plouffe, Michael. 2017. ‘Firm Heterogeneity and Trade-Policy Stances: Evidence from a Survey of
Japanese Producers.’ Business and Politics 19(1):1-40.
Further Reading:
Blonigen, Bruce. 2011. ‘Revisiting the Evidence on Trade Policy Preferences.’ Journal of International
Economics 85(1): 129-135.
Guisinger, Alexandra. 2009. ‘Determining Trade Policy: Do Voters Hold Politicians Accountable?’
International Organization 63(3): 533-557.
Hiscox, Michael. 2002. ‘Commerce, Coalitions, and Factor Mobility: Evidence from Congressional Votes
on Trade Legislation.’ American Political Science Review 96.3.
Mansfield, Edward and Diana Mutz. 2009. ‘Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics,
and Out-Group Anxiety.’ International Organization 63.3.
Mayda, Anna Maria, and Dani Rodrik. 2005. ‘Why Are Some People (and Countries) More Protectionist
Than Others?’ European Economic Review 49(6): 1393-1430.
Naoi, Megumi, and Ikuo Kume. 2011. ‘Explaining Mass Support for Agricultural Protectionism:
Evidence from a Survey Experiment during the Great Recession.’ International Organization 65(4): 771-
795.
Schaffer, Lena, and Gabriele Spilker. 2015. ‘Adding Another Level: Individual Responses to
Globalization and Government Welfare Policies.’ Political Science Research and Methods.
Walter, Stefanie. 2015. ‘Globalization and the Demand Side of Politics: How Globalization Shapes Labor
Market Risk Perceptions and Policy Preferences.’ Political Science Research and Methods.
8
Week IV: Trade institutions
Last week we explored the sources of preferences over trade policy. This week’s materials assess the influence of the domestic
and international institutions that govern representation and policy-making processes.
Required Reading:
Johns, Leslie, and Lauren Peritz. 2015 ‘The Design of Trade Agreements.’ In The Oxford Handbook on the
Politics of International Trade, Lisa Martin, ed.
Davis, Christina and Meredith Wilf. 2015. ‘WTO Membership.’ In The Oxford Handbook on the Politics of
International Trade, Lisa Martin, ed.
Rickard, Stephanie. 2015. ‘Electoral Systems and Trade.’ In: Lisa Martin (ed.) The Oxford Handbook on the
Political Economy of International Trade (New York: Oxford University Press).
Wagner, P. and Plouffe, M., 2019. Electoral systems and trade-policy outcomes: the effects of personal-
vote incentives on barriers to international trade. Public Choice, 180(3-4), pp.333-352.
Further Reading:
Ardelean, Adina and Carolyn Evans. 2013. ‘Electoral Systems and Protectionism: An Industry-level
Analysis.’ Canadian Journal of Economics 46.2.
Bombardini, Matilde. 2008. ‘Firm Heterogeneity and Lobby Participation.’ Journal of International Economics
75(2): 329-348.
Hayakawa, Kazunobu, Sjuhiro Urata, Taiyo Yoshimi. 2019. ‘Choosing Between Multiple Regional Trade
Agreements: Evidence from Japan’s Imports.’ Review of International Economics, 27.2.
Hiscox, Michael. 1999. ‘The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform, and Trade Liberalization.’
Kono, Daniel. 2006. ‘Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency.’ American Political
Science Review 100(3): 369-384.
Kono, Daniel. 2007. ‘When Do Trade Blocs Block Trade?’ International Studies Quarterly, 51.1.
Meunier, Sophie and Kalypso Nicolaidis. 2006. ‘The European Union as a conflicted trade power.’ Journal
of European Public Policy 13:6.
Milner, Helen. 1987. ‘Resisting the Protectionist Temptation: Industry and the Making of Trade Policy
in France and the United States During the 1970s.’ International Organization 41(4): 639-665.
Osgood, Iain. 2016. ‘Differentiated Products, Divided Industries: Firms and the Politics of Intra-Industry
Trade.’ Economics and Politics.
Plouffe, Michael. 2012. ‘Liberalization for Sale: Heterogeneous Firms and Lobbying over FTAs.’
Manuscript prepared for APSA annual meeting.
Rickard, Stephanie. 2012. ‘A Non-Tariff Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics: Government
Subsidies and Electoral Institutions.’ International Studies Quarterly 56(4): 777-785.
Rickard, Stephanie. 2012. ‘Electoral Systems, Voters’ Interests and Geographic Dispersion.’ British Journal
of Political Science 42(4): 855-877.
9
Week V: Trade in services and foreign investment
Last week we explored the sources of preferences over trade policy. This week’s materials assess the influence of the domestic
and international institutions that govern representation and policy-making processes.
Required Reading:
‘The rise of services in the global economy,’ in: OECD, 2017, Services Trade Policies and the Global
Economy. Paris: OECD.
Chase, Kerry, 2008. ‘Moving Hollywood Abroad: Divided Labor Markets and the New Politics of Trade
in Services.’ International Organization 62 (4):653-687
Harish, N. and Plouffe, M., 2018. The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment to Developing
Countries. OSF.io.
Kim, Soo Yeon. 2015. ‘Deep Integration and Regional Trade Agreements.’ In The Oxford Handbook on the
Politics of International Trade, Lisa Martin, ed.
Further Reading:
Barry, Colin M., and Matthew DiGiuseppe. 2019. ‘Transparency, Risk, and FDI.’ Political Research Quarterly
72.1.
Beverelli, Cosimo, Matteo Fiorini, and Bernard Hoekman, 2017. ‘Services trade policy and manufacturing
productivity: The role of institutions.’ Journal of International Economics 104:166-182.
Deardorff, Alan, 2001. ‘International Provision of Trade Services, Trade, and Fragmentation.’ Review of
International Economics 9 (2):233-248.
Gadrey, Jean. 2000. ‘The Characterization of Goods and Services: An Alternative Approach.’ Review of
Income and Wealth 46 (3):369-387.
Helpman, Elhanan. 2006. ‘Trade, FDI, and the Organization of Firms.’ Journal of Economic Literature.
Hill, Peter. 1999. ‘Tangibles, Intangibles and Services: a new Taxonomy for Classification of Output.’
Canadian Journal of Economics 32 (2):426 – 447.
Jensen, Nathan. 2008. ‘Political Risk, Democratic Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment.’ Journal of
Politics 70.4.
Johns, Leslie and Rachel L. Wellhausen. 2016. ‘Under One Roof: Supply Chains and the Protection of
Foreign Investment.’ American Political Science Review 110.1.
Marcel Timmer, Abdul Azeez Erumban, Bart Los, Robert Stehrer and Gaaitzen de Vries, 2014. ‘Slicing
Up Global Value Chains,’ Journal of Economic Perspectives 28 (2), pp. 99-118.
Nordås, Hildegunn K., and Dorothée. Rouzet. 2017. ‘The Impact of Services Trade Restrictiveness on
Trade Flows.’ The World Economy 40 (6):1155-1183.
Pandya, Sonal S. 2010. ‘Labor Markets and the Demand for Foreign Direct Investment.’ International
Organization.
Pandya, Sonal S. 2014. ‘Democratization and Foreign Direct Investment Liberalization, 1970–2000.’
International Studies Quarterly 58.3.
Weymouth, Stephen. 2017. ‘Service Firms in the Politics of US Trade Policy.’ International Studies Quarterly
61:935–947.
10
Week VI: Regulating trade
Having assessed domestic sources of trade policy, what forces influence trade policy at the international level? How are
countries limited in the range of policy options they can implement? How do these factors influence trade policy and trade
flows?
Required Reading:
Hoekman, Bernard. 2002. The WTO: functions and basic principles. In: Bernard Hoekman et al., eds.
Development, Trade and the WTO: A Handbook. Washington DC: World Bank.
Chauffour, Jean-Pierre and Jean-Christophe Maur. Beyond market access: The new normal of preferential
trade agreements. World Bank Policy Research WP 5454, 2010.
Deardorff, A. and Stern, R. 2002. ‘What You Should Know about Globalization and the World Trade
Organization.’ Review of International Economics 10.3.
Goldstein, Judith, Miles Kahler, Robert Keohane, and Anne-Marie Slaughter. 2000. ‘Introduction:
Legalization and World Politics. International Organization 54:3.
Further Reading:
Davis, Christina L and Meredith Wilf. 2015. ‘WTO Membership.’ In: Lisa Martin (ed.) The Oxford
Handbook on the Political Economy of International Trade (New York: Oxford University Press).
Kucik, Jeffrey and Kristoff Pelc. 2016. ‘Over-Commitment and Backsliding in International Trade.’
European Journal of Political Research.
Manger, Mark. 2012. ‘Vertical Trade Specialization and the Formation of North-South PTAs.’ World
Politics 64(4): 622-58.
Mansfield, Edward, Helen Milner, and Jon Pevehouse. 2007. ‘Vetoing Co-operation: The Impact of Veto
Players on Preferential Trading Agreements.’ British Journal of Political Science 37(3): 403-432.
Milner, Helen V. and B. Peter Rosendorf. 1997. ‘Democratic Politics and International Trade
Negotiations: Elections and Divided Government as Constraints on Trade Liberalization.’ Journal of
Conflict Resolution 41.1.
11
Week VII: Regulating goods trade
What are the major regulatory challenges of cross-border goods trade and how are they dealt with in applied and bound
regimes?
Required Reading:
Hoekman, Bernard, and Michel Kostecki. 2008. The Political Economy of the World Trading System,
3/E (Oxford: Oxford University Press), ch. 5, 10
Further Reading:
Hoekman, Bernard, and Michel Kostecki. 2008. The Political Economy of the World Trading System,
3/E (Oxford: Oxford University Press), ch. 9
Kim, Soo Yeon. 2015. ‘Deep Integration and Regional Trade Agreements.’ In: Lisa Martin (ed.) The
Oxford Handbook on the Political Economy of International Trade (New York: Oxford University
Press).
Veggeland, Frode and Svein Ole Borgen. 2005. Negotiating International Food Standards: The World
Trade Organization’s Impact on the Codex Alimentarius Commission. Governance 18(4).
12
Week VIII: Regulating services trade
(How) is trade in services different from trade in goods? What is the role of services trade in developed and developing
countries?
Note: this week Mr. Stephen Adams, Global Counsel, will give a guest lecture.
Required:
Hoekman, Bernard, and Michel Kostecki. 2008. The Political Economy of the World Trading System,
3/E (Oxford: Oxford University Press), ch. 7
Adlung, Rudolf, and Martin Roy, 2005. ‘Turning Hills into Mountains? Current Commitments under the
General Agreement on Trade in Services and Prospects for Change.’ Journal of World Trade 39 (6):1161-
1194.
Further reading:
Adlung, Rolf and Aaditya Mattoo. ‘The GATS’, In: Aaditya Mattoo, Robert Stern, and Gianni Zanini. A
Handbook of International Trade In Services. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bhagwati, Jagdish 1987. ‘Trade in Services and the Multilateral Trade Negotiations.’ The World Bank
Economic Review 1 (4):549-569.
Crystal, Jonathan. 2003. ‘Bargaining in the Negotiations over Liberalizing Trade in Services: Power,
Reciprocity and Learning.’ Review of International Political Economy 10 (3):552-578
Drake, William J., and Kalypso. Nicolaïdis, 1992. ‘Ideas, Interests, and Institutionalization: "Trade in
Services" and the Uruguay Round.’ International Organization 46 (1):37-100.
Hoekman, Bernard, and Aaditya Mattoo. 2013. ‘Liberalizing Trade in Services: Lessons from Regional
and WTO Negotiations.’ International Negotiation 18 (1):131-151.
Hoekman, Bernard. 2006. ‘Liberalizing Trade in Services: A Survey.’ World Bank Policy Research Working
Paper (4030).
Hoekman, Bernard., Aaditya Mattoo, and Andre Sapir. 2007. ‘The Political Economy of Services Trade
Liberalization: a Case for International Regulatory Cooperation?’ Oxford Review of Economic Policy 23
(3):367-391.
Mattoo, Aaditya, and Carsten Fink, 2004. ‘Regional Agreements and Trade in Services: Policy Issues.’
Journal of Economic Integration 19 (4):742-779.
‘Mapping regulations and evaluating governance,’ in: Martin Molinuevo and Sebastian Saez Regulatory
assessment toolkit: A practical methodology for assessing regulation on trade and investment in
services. Washington D.C.: World Bank.
OECD, 2017. International Regulatory Cooperation and Trade: Understanding the Trade Costs of
Regulatory Divergence and the Remedies. Paris: OECD.
Wunsch-Vincent, Sacha, 2003. ‘The Digital Trade Agenda of the U.S.: Parallel Tracks of Bilateral,
Regional and Multilateral Liberalization.’ Aussenwirtschaft 58 (1):7-46.
13
Week IX: Regulating foreign investment
How is foreign investment regulated and protected?
Required:
Bonnitcha, Jonathan, Lauge Poulsen and Michael Waibel. 2017. The Political Economy of the Investment
Treaty Regime (Oxford: Oxford University Press), ch. 2-6.
Further reading:
Aaken, Anne van. 2009. ‘International Investment Law Between Commitment and Flexibility: A Contract
Theory Analysis.’ Journal of International Economic Law 12.
Bonnitcha, Jonathan, Lauge Poulsen and Michael Waibel. 2015. The Political Economy of the Investment
Treaty Regime (Oxford: Oxford University Press), ch. 7-9.
Damgaard, Jannick, and Thomas Elkjaer. 2017. The Global FDI Network: Searching for Ultimate
Investors. IMF Working Paper 17/258, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
Jensen, Nathan M and Edmund J. Maleksy. 2018. Does the OECD Convention affect bribery?
Investment liberalization and corruption in Vietnam. International Organization.
Manger, Mark. 2009. Investing in Protection (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), ch. 3.
Maurer, Noel. 2013. The Empire Trap: The Rise and Fall of U.S. Intervention to Protect American
Property Overseas, 1893-2013. (Princeton: Princeton University Press), ch. 8-11.
Pauwelyn, Joost. 2015. ‘The Rule of Law without the Rule of Lawyers? Why Investment Arbitrators are
from Mars, Trade Adjudicators from Venus.’ American Journal of International Law 109.
Post, Alison and Maria Murillo. 2016. ‘How Investor Portfolios Shape Regulatory Outcomes: Privatized
Infrastructure after Crises.’ World Development 77.
Poulsen, Lauge. 2015. Bounded Rationality and Economic Diplomacy: The Politics of Investment
Treaties in Developing Countries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), ch. 1 and 4-6.
Stiglitz, Joseph. 2007. ‘Regulating Multinational Corporations: Towards Principles of Cross-Border Legal
Frameworks in a Globalized World Balancing Rights with Responsibilities.’ American University
International Law Review 23(3): 451-558.
Van Harten, Gus. 2005. ‘Private Authority and Transnational Governance: The Contours of the
International System of Investor Protection.’ Review of International Political Economy 12(4): 600-623.
Walter, Andrew. 2001. ‘NGOs, Business, and International Investment: The Multilateral Agreement on
Investment, Seattle, and Beyond.’ Global Governance 7.
14
Week X: Dispute settlement
Why, and how, are trade and investment disputes resolved? Why are there no major concerns with non-compliance?
Required:
Hoekman, Bernard, and Michel Kostecki. 2008. The Political Economy of the World Trading System,
3/E (Oxford: Oxford University Press), ch. 3
Lang, Andrew, and Joanne Scott. 2009. The hidden world of WTO governance. European Journal of
International Law 20(2) [you don’t have to read section 4 onwards].
Further reading:
Bown, Chad and Bernark Hoekman. 2005. ‘WTO Dispute Settlement and the Missing Developing
Country Cases: Engaging the Private Sector.’ Journal of International Economic Law 8:4.
Busch, Marc and Eric Reinhardt. 2000. ‘Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Early Settlement in
GATT/WTO Disputes.’ Fordham International Law Journal 24:1.
Busch, Marc. 2007. ‘Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in International
Trade.’ International Organization 61:4
Chase, Claude, Alan Yanovich, Jo-Ann Crawford, and Pamela Ugaz. Mapping of dispute settlement
mechanisms in regional trade agreements - innovative or variations on a theme?. WTO Staff Working
paper, 2013.
Davis, Christina. 2012. Why Adjudicate? Enforcing Trade Rules in the WTO. (Princeton: Princeton
University Press), ch. 2.
Davis, Christina and Yuki Shirato. 2007. ‘Firms, Governments, and WTO Adjudication: Japan’s Selection
of WTO Disputes.’ World Politics 59:2.
Goldstein, Judith, and Lisa Martin. 2000. ‘Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic Politics: A
Cautionary Note.’ International Organization 54:3.
Goldstein, Judith, and Richard Steinberg. 2008. ‘Negotiate or Litigate? Effects of WTO Judicial
Delegation on US Trade Politics.’ Law and Contemporary Problems. 71.
Kucik, Jeffrey, and Eric Reinhardt. 2008. ‘Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to the
Global Trade Regime.’ International Organization 62(3): 477-505.
Sykes, Alan. 2012. ‘The Dispute Settlement Mechanism: Ensuring Compliance.’ In: The Oxford
Handbook on the World Trade Organization (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012).
Pelc, Krzysztof. 2010. ‘Eluding Efficiency: Why do we Not See More Efficient Breach at the WTO?’
World Trade Review 9:4.
Steinberg, Richard. 2004. ‘Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political
Constraints.’ American Journal of International Law 98:2.
Weiler, Joseph. 2001. ‘The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomacy.’ Journal of World Trade 35:2.
学霸联盟
UCL DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY
Module Name: International Political Economy
Module Code: PUBL0004
Teaching: 10 hours of lectures, 10 hours of seminars
Credits: 15
Assessment: 1,000 word essay, 2,000 word coursework
Essay Deadline/s: Essay: Monday, 22nd February 2021 (before 2pm)
Coursework: Monday, 26th April 2021 (before 2pm)
Lecturers: Dr Michael Plouffe, Dr Conrad Copeland, and Dr Lauge Poulsen
Office Hours: Available on Moodle through SPPBook (enrolment key: sppbook) or by appointment.
Useful Links
UCL Timetable
Extenuating Circumstances
Essay Extensions
Penalties for Late Submission
Penalties for Overlength Essays
Essay Submission Information
Examinations
Plagiarism and TurnItIn
Plagiarism and Academic Writing - a Guide for Students (you will need to log in and enrol yourself on the page)
2
PUBL0004: International Political Economy
Dr. Michael Plouffe, Dr. Conrad Copeland, and Dr. Lauge Poulsen
Emails: michael.plouffe@ucl.ac.uk, conrad.copeland@ucl.ac.uk; and l.poulsen@ucl.ac.uk
Course Objectives
This course introduces students to the study of international political economy (IPE), focusing on
international trade and foreign investment. We discuss and critically assess critically recent theories and
evidence on which political, economic, and legal factors enable and constrain the global trade and
investment regimes. There are no prerequisites for this class.
Organization of Teaching
The course is taught through weekly recorded lectures and live online seminars.
The lectures will be dedicated to introducing broad theories and concepts, providing historical overviews
of each week’s topic, looking at relevant data, and raising questions for further discussion in the seminars.
The lectures are designed to provide sufficient background for more detailed and fruitful group
discussions.
The seminars will cover each week’s topic in detail. The object of the seminar is to facilitate student
participation and interaction as well as broaden students’ understandings of the issues and debates
introduced in the lectures. Students will be expected to demonstrate an understanding of the relevant
theories and concepts and apply these theories to particular policy domains.
Assessment Criteria
For the 2020-2021 academic year, students will be assessed by two equally weighted written assignments.
Detailed guidelines and expectations will be distributed during the term. The essays must be double-
spaced, have numbered pages, be correctly and consistently referenced, and include a bibliography.
A note on plagiarism. Cheating and plagiarism are unacceptable. Students caught committing either of these
breaches of conduct will be subject to the disciplinary procedures detailed in the University Handbook.
Students should consult the Handbook for a comprehensive description of academic dishonesty.
Students with any questions should seek clarification prior to submission of work.
3
Course Outline
A note on the readings. Students are expected to read each item listed under required and very strongly
encouraged to read widely among the suggestions for further readings. Suggestions for background readings
are also occasionally provided. The minimum expectation is four articles/chapters per week (in
other words, the required readings are not always sufficient) but a good performance in the
course requires significant engagement the further readings as well. Some changes to the reading
list may be made during the term. However, sufficient notice will always be provided (no less than one
week).
Students are encouraged (but not required) to buy:
The following three books are recommended (but not required):
Clark, Gregory. 2007. A Farewell to Alms: A Brief Economic History of the World (Princeton:
Princeton University Press).
Frieden, Jeffry. 2006. Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century (New York:
Norton)
Oatley, Thomas. 2012. International Political Economy, 5/E. (New York: Pearson-Longman),
The following two on intellectual history are recommended (but not required):
Irwin, Douglas. 1996. Against the Tide: An Intellectual History of Free Trade (Princeton:
Princeton University Press).
Sally, Razeen. 1998. Classical Liberalism and International Economic Order (London:
Routledge).
The following book is useful (but not required) for a general supporting text on international economics:
Krugman, Paul, Maurice Obstfeld, and Marc Melitz. 2014. International Economics, 10/E. (New
York: Pearson).
4
Part I: Political economy foundations
Week 1: Current events and international political economy
Week 2: Economic foundations of international trade
Week 3: Trade preferences
Week 4: Trade institutions
Week 5: Trade in services and foreign investment
Part II: Political economy of regulation
Week 6: Regulating trade
Week 7: Regulating goods trade
Week 8: Regulating services trade
Week 9: Regulating foreign investment
Week 10: Dispute settlement
5
Week I: Current events and international political economy
What is international political economy? We briefly introduce the field and discuss current events through the analytical lens
of IPE.
Required reading:
Gruszczynski, Lukasz. 2020. The COVID-19 Pandemic and International Trade: Temporary Turbulence
or Paradigm Shift?. European Journal of Risk Regulation, 11(2), pp.337-342.
Kwan, Chi Hung. 2020. The China–US trade war: Deep‐rooted causes, shifting focus and uncertain
prospects. Asian Economic Policy Review, 15(1), pp.55-72.
Lake, David A. 2009. Open economy politics: A critical review. Review of International Organizations, 4(3),
pp.219-244.
Owen, Erica and Stephanie Walter. 2017. 'Open economy politics and Brexit: Insights, puzzles, and ways
forward.' Review of International Political Economy 24(2).
Further reading:
Adams, Stephen, 2016. The future of UK trade policy: the case for regulatory diplomacy. 9th September,
global-counsel.co.uk.
Borchert, Ingo. 2016. Services trade in the UK: What is at stake? UKTPO Briefing Paper 6.
Farrell, Henry and Abe Newman. 2017. 'BREXIT, voice and loyalty: rethinking electoral politics in an
age of interdependence.' Review of International Political Economy 24(2).
Itakura, Ken. 2020. Evaluating the impact of the US–China trade war. Asian Economic Policy Review, 15(1),
pp.77-93.
Holmes, Peter, 2016. 'Roos and rules: Why the EEA is not the same as membership of the Single
Market.' UKTPO Briefing Paper 3.
Springford, John and Samuel Lowe, 2018. Britain’s services firms can’t defy gravity, alas. Centre for
European Reform.
6
Week II: Economic foundations of international trade
What are the characteristics of international trade in the 21st century? Why do countries engage in international trade and
what are the basic costs and benefits?
Required Reading:
Bannerman, Gordon. 2015. ‘The Free Trade Idea,’ In: Lisa Martin (ed.) The Oxford Handbook on the
Political Economy of International Trade. New York: Oxford University Press.
Bernard, A.B., Jensen, J.B., Redding, S.J. and Schott, P.K., 2007. Firms in international trade. Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 21(3), pp.105-130.
Bown, Chad. 2015. ‘Trade Policy Instruments Over Time.’ In: Lisa Martin (ed.) The Oxford Handbook
on the Political Economy of International Trade. New York: Oxford University Press.
Chapter 11 in: Albert Park, Gaurav Nayyar, and Patrick Low. Supply chain perspectives and issues.
Geneva: WTO, 2013.
Further Reading:
Barin, Samuel. 2015. ‘Trade and Environment.’ In: Lisa Martin (ed.) The Oxford Handbook on the
Political Economy of International Trade. New York: Oxford University Press.
Manger, Mark and Kenneth Shadlen. 2015. ‘Trade and Development. In: Lisa Martin (ed.) The Oxford
Handbook on the Political Economy of International Trade. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Pavcnik, Nina. Globalization and within-country inequality, In: Marc Bacchetta and Marion Jansen, eds.
Making Globalization Socially Sustainable. Geneva: WTO and ILO, 2011.
7
Week III: Trade preferences
How do trade’s effects contribute to policy preferences? What other factors influence the formation of preferences and their
configuration in the aggregate?
Required Reading:
Baker, Andy. 2005. ‘Who Wants to Globalize? Consumer Tastes and Labor Markets in a Theory of Trade
Policy Beliefs.’ American Journal of Political Science 49(4): 924-938.
Kuo, Jason and Megumi Naoi. 2015. ‘Individual Attitudes.’ In: Lisa Martin (ed.) The Oxford Handbook
on the Political Economy of International Trade. New York: Oxford University Press.
Plouffe, Michael. 2015. ‘Heterogeneous Firms and Trade-Policy Preferences.’ In: Lisa Martin (ed.) The
Oxford Handbook on the Political Economy of International Trade. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Plouffe, Michael. 2017. ‘Firm Heterogeneity and Trade-Policy Stances: Evidence from a Survey of
Japanese Producers.’ Business and Politics 19(1):1-40.
Further Reading:
Blonigen, Bruce. 2011. ‘Revisiting the Evidence on Trade Policy Preferences.’ Journal of International
Economics 85(1): 129-135.
Guisinger, Alexandra. 2009. ‘Determining Trade Policy: Do Voters Hold Politicians Accountable?’
International Organization 63(3): 533-557.
Hiscox, Michael. 2002. ‘Commerce, Coalitions, and Factor Mobility: Evidence from Congressional Votes
on Trade Legislation.’ American Political Science Review 96.3.
Mansfield, Edward and Diana Mutz. 2009. ‘Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics,
and Out-Group Anxiety.’ International Organization 63.3.
Mayda, Anna Maria, and Dani Rodrik. 2005. ‘Why Are Some People (and Countries) More Protectionist
Than Others?’ European Economic Review 49(6): 1393-1430.
Naoi, Megumi, and Ikuo Kume. 2011. ‘Explaining Mass Support for Agricultural Protectionism:
Evidence from a Survey Experiment during the Great Recession.’ International Organization 65(4): 771-
795.
Schaffer, Lena, and Gabriele Spilker. 2015. ‘Adding Another Level: Individual Responses to
Globalization and Government Welfare Policies.’ Political Science Research and Methods.
Walter, Stefanie. 2015. ‘Globalization and the Demand Side of Politics: How Globalization Shapes Labor
Market Risk Perceptions and Policy Preferences.’ Political Science Research and Methods.
8
Week IV: Trade institutions
Last week we explored the sources of preferences over trade policy. This week’s materials assess the influence of the domestic
and international institutions that govern representation and policy-making processes.
Required Reading:
Johns, Leslie, and Lauren Peritz. 2015 ‘The Design of Trade Agreements.’ In The Oxford Handbook on the
Politics of International Trade, Lisa Martin, ed.
Davis, Christina and Meredith Wilf. 2015. ‘WTO Membership.’ In The Oxford Handbook on the Politics of
International Trade, Lisa Martin, ed.
Rickard, Stephanie. 2015. ‘Electoral Systems and Trade.’ In: Lisa Martin (ed.) The Oxford Handbook on the
Political Economy of International Trade (New York: Oxford University Press).
Wagner, P. and Plouffe, M., 2019. Electoral systems and trade-policy outcomes: the effects of personal-
vote incentives on barriers to international trade. Public Choice, 180(3-4), pp.333-352.
Further Reading:
Ardelean, Adina and Carolyn Evans. 2013. ‘Electoral Systems and Protectionism: An Industry-level
Analysis.’ Canadian Journal of Economics 46.2.
Bombardini, Matilde. 2008. ‘Firm Heterogeneity and Lobby Participation.’ Journal of International Economics
75(2): 329-348.
Hayakawa, Kazunobu, Sjuhiro Urata, Taiyo Yoshimi. 2019. ‘Choosing Between Multiple Regional Trade
Agreements: Evidence from Japan’s Imports.’ Review of International Economics, 27.2.
Hiscox, Michael. 1999. ‘The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform, and Trade Liberalization.’
Kono, Daniel. 2006. ‘Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency.’ American Political
Science Review 100(3): 369-384.
Kono, Daniel. 2007. ‘When Do Trade Blocs Block Trade?’ International Studies Quarterly, 51.1.
Meunier, Sophie and Kalypso Nicolaidis. 2006. ‘The European Union as a conflicted trade power.’ Journal
of European Public Policy 13:6.
Milner, Helen. 1987. ‘Resisting the Protectionist Temptation: Industry and the Making of Trade Policy
in France and the United States During the 1970s.’ International Organization 41(4): 639-665.
Osgood, Iain. 2016. ‘Differentiated Products, Divided Industries: Firms and the Politics of Intra-Industry
Trade.’ Economics and Politics.
Plouffe, Michael. 2012. ‘Liberalization for Sale: Heterogeneous Firms and Lobbying over FTAs.’
Manuscript prepared for APSA annual meeting.
Rickard, Stephanie. 2012. ‘A Non-Tariff Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics: Government
Subsidies and Electoral Institutions.’ International Studies Quarterly 56(4): 777-785.
Rickard, Stephanie. 2012. ‘Electoral Systems, Voters’ Interests and Geographic Dispersion.’ British Journal
of Political Science 42(4): 855-877.
9
Week V: Trade in services and foreign investment
Last week we explored the sources of preferences over trade policy. This week’s materials assess the influence of the domestic
and international institutions that govern representation and policy-making processes.
Required Reading:
‘The rise of services in the global economy,’ in: OECD, 2017, Services Trade Policies and the Global
Economy. Paris: OECD.
Chase, Kerry, 2008. ‘Moving Hollywood Abroad: Divided Labor Markets and the New Politics of Trade
in Services.’ International Organization 62 (4):653-687
Harish, N. and Plouffe, M., 2018. The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment to Developing
Countries. OSF.io.
Kim, Soo Yeon. 2015. ‘Deep Integration and Regional Trade Agreements.’ In The Oxford Handbook on the
Politics of International Trade, Lisa Martin, ed.
Further Reading:
Barry, Colin M., and Matthew DiGiuseppe. 2019. ‘Transparency, Risk, and FDI.’ Political Research Quarterly
72.1.
Beverelli, Cosimo, Matteo Fiorini, and Bernard Hoekman, 2017. ‘Services trade policy and manufacturing
productivity: The role of institutions.’ Journal of International Economics 104:166-182.
Deardorff, Alan, 2001. ‘International Provision of Trade Services, Trade, and Fragmentation.’ Review of
International Economics 9 (2):233-248.
Gadrey, Jean. 2000. ‘The Characterization of Goods and Services: An Alternative Approach.’ Review of
Income and Wealth 46 (3):369-387.
Helpman, Elhanan. 2006. ‘Trade, FDI, and the Organization of Firms.’ Journal of Economic Literature.
Hill, Peter. 1999. ‘Tangibles, Intangibles and Services: a new Taxonomy for Classification of Output.’
Canadian Journal of Economics 32 (2):426 – 447.
Jensen, Nathan. 2008. ‘Political Risk, Democratic Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment.’ Journal of
Politics 70.4.
Johns, Leslie and Rachel L. Wellhausen. 2016. ‘Under One Roof: Supply Chains and the Protection of
Foreign Investment.’ American Political Science Review 110.1.
Marcel Timmer, Abdul Azeez Erumban, Bart Los, Robert Stehrer and Gaaitzen de Vries, 2014. ‘Slicing
Up Global Value Chains,’ Journal of Economic Perspectives 28 (2), pp. 99-118.
Nordås, Hildegunn K., and Dorothée. Rouzet. 2017. ‘The Impact of Services Trade Restrictiveness on
Trade Flows.’ The World Economy 40 (6):1155-1183.
Pandya, Sonal S. 2010. ‘Labor Markets and the Demand for Foreign Direct Investment.’ International
Organization.
Pandya, Sonal S. 2014. ‘Democratization and Foreign Direct Investment Liberalization, 1970–2000.’
International Studies Quarterly 58.3.
Weymouth, Stephen. 2017. ‘Service Firms in the Politics of US Trade Policy.’ International Studies Quarterly
61:935–947.
10
Week VI: Regulating trade
Having assessed domestic sources of trade policy, what forces influence trade policy at the international level? How are
countries limited in the range of policy options they can implement? How do these factors influence trade policy and trade
flows?
Required Reading:
Hoekman, Bernard. 2002. The WTO: functions and basic principles. In: Bernard Hoekman et al., eds.
Development, Trade and the WTO: A Handbook. Washington DC: World Bank.
Chauffour, Jean-Pierre and Jean-Christophe Maur. Beyond market access: The new normal of preferential
trade agreements. World Bank Policy Research WP 5454, 2010.
Deardorff, A. and Stern, R. 2002. ‘What You Should Know about Globalization and the World Trade
Organization.’ Review of International Economics 10.3.
Goldstein, Judith, Miles Kahler, Robert Keohane, and Anne-Marie Slaughter. 2000. ‘Introduction:
Legalization and World Politics. International Organization 54:3.
Further Reading:
Davis, Christina L and Meredith Wilf. 2015. ‘WTO Membership.’ In: Lisa Martin (ed.) The Oxford
Handbook on the Political Economy of International Trade (New York: Oxford University Press).
Kucik, Jeffrey and Kristoff Pelc. 2016. ‘Over-Commitment and Backsliding in International Trade.’
European Journal of Political Research.
Manger, Mark. 2012. ‘Vertical Trade Specialization and the Formation of North-South PTAs.’ World
Politics 64(4): 622-58.
Mansfield, Edward, Helen Milner, and Jon Pevehouse. 2007. ‘Vetoing Co-operation: The Impact of Veto
Players on Preferential Trading Agreements.’ British Journal of Political Science 37(3): 403-432.
Milner, Helen V. and B. Peter Rosendorf. 1997. ‘Democratic Politics and International Trade
Negotiations: Elections and Divided Government as Constraints on Trade Liberalization.’ Journal of
Conflict Resolution 41.1.
11
Week VII: Regulating goods trade
What are the major regulatory challenges of cross-border goods trade and how are they dealt with in applied and bound
regimes?
Required Reading:
Hoekman, Bernard, and Michel Kostecki. 2008. The Political Economy of the World Trading System,
3/E (Oxford: Oxford University Press), ch. 5, 10
Further Reading:
Hoekman, Bernard, and Michel Kostecki. 2008. The Political Economy of the World Trading System,
3/E (Oxford: Oxford University Press), ch. 9
Kim, Soo Yeon. 2015. ‘Deep Integration and Regional Trade Agreements.’ In: Lisa Martin (ed.) The
Oxford Handbook on the Political Economy of International Trade (New York: Oxford University
Press).
Veggeland, Frode and Svein Ole Borgen. 2005. Negotiating International Food Standards: The World
Trade Organization’s Impact on the Codex Alimentarius Commission. Governance 18(4).
12
Week VIII: Regulating services trade
(How) is trade in services different from trade in goods? What is the role of services trade in developed and developing
countries?
Note: this week Mr. Stephen Adams, Global Counsel, will give a guest lecture.
Required:
Hoekman, Bernard, and Michel Kostecki. 2008. The Political Economy of the World Trading System,
3/E (Oxford: Oxford University Press), ch. 7
Adlung, Rudolf, and Martin Roy, 2005. ‘Turning Hills into Mountains? Current Commitments under the
General Agreement on Trade in Services and Prospects for Change.’ Journal of World Trade 39 (6):1161-
1194.
Further reading:
Adlung, Rolf and Aaditya Mattoo. ‘The GATS’, In: Aaditya Mattoo, Robert Stern, and Gianni Zanini. A
Handbook of International Trade In Services. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bhagwati, Jagdish 1987. ‘Trade in Services and the Multilateral Trade Negotiations.’ The World Bank
Economic Review 1 (4):549-569.
Crystal, Jonathan. 2003. ‘Bargaining in the Negotiations over Liberalizing Trade in Services: Power,
Reciprocity and Learning.’ Review of International Political Economy 10 (3):552-578
Drake, William J., and Kalypso. Nicolaïdis, 1992. ‘Ideas, Interests, and Institutionalization: "Trade in
Services" and the Uruguay Round.’ International Organization 46 (1):37-100.
Hoekman, Bernard, and Aaditya Mattoo. 2013. ‘Liberalizing Trade in Services: Lessons from Regional
and WTO Negotiations.’ International Negotiation 18 (1):131-151.
Hoekman, Bernard. 2006. ‘Liberalizing Trade in Services: A Survey.’ World Bank Policy Research Working
Paper (4030).
Hoekman, Bernard., Aaditya Mattoo, and Andre Sapir. 2007. ‘The Political Economy of Services Trade
Liberalization: a Case for International Regulatory Cooperation?’ Oxford Review of Economic Policy 23
(3):367-391.
Mattoo, Aaditya, and Carsten Fink, 2004. ‘Regional Agreements and Trade in Services: Policy Issues.’
Journal of Economic Integration 19 (4):742-779.
‘Mapping regulations and evaluating governance,’ in: Martin Molinuevo and Sebastian Saez Regulatory
assessment toolkit: A practical methodology for assessing regulation on trade and investment in
services. Washington D.C.: World Bank.
OECD, 2017. International Regulatory Cooperation and Trade: Understanding the Trade Costs of
Regulatory Divergence and the Remedies. Paris: OECD.
Wunsch-Vincent, Sacha, 2003. ‘The Digital Trade Agenda of the U.S.: Parallel Tracks of Bilateral,
Regional and Multilateral Liberalization.’ Aussenwirtschaft 58 (1):7-46.
13
Week IX: Regulating foreign investment
How is foreign investment regulated and protected?
Required:
Bonnitcha, Jonathan, Lauge Poulsen and Michael Waibel. 2017. The Political Economy of the Investment
Treaty Regime (Oxford: Oxford University Press), ch. 2-6.
Further reading:
Aaken, Anne van. 2009. ‘International Investment Law Between Commitment and Flexibility: A Contract
Theory Analysis.’ Journal of International Economic Law 12.
Bonnitcha, Jonathan, Lauge Poulsen and Michael Waibel. 2015. The Political Economy of the Investment
Treaty Regime (Oxford: Oxford University Press), ch. 7-9.
Damgaard, Jannick, and Thomas Elkjaer. 2017. The Global FDI Network: Searching for Ultimate
Investors. IMF Working Paper 17/258, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
Jensen, Nathan M and Edmund J. Maleksy. 2018. Does the OECD Convention affect bribery?
Investment liberalization and corruption in Vietnam. International Organization.
Manger, Mark. 2009. Investing in Protection (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), ch. 3.
Maurer, Noel. 2013. The Empire Trap: The Rise and Fall of U.S. Intervention to Protect American
Property Overseas, 1893-2013. (Princeton: Princeton University Press), ch. 8-11.
Pauwelyn, Joost. 2015. ‘The Rule of Law without the Rule of Lawyers? Why Investment Arbitrators are
from Mars, Trade Adjudicators from Venus.’ American Journal of International Law 109.
Post, Alison and Maria Murillo. 2016. ‘How Investor Portfolios Shape Regulatory Outcomes: Privatized
Infrastructure after Crises.’ World Development 77.
Poulsen, Lauge. 2015. Bounded Rationality and Economic Diplomacy: The Politics of Investment
Treaties in Developing Countries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), ch. 1 and 4-6.
Stiglitz, Joseph. 2007. ‘Regulating Multinational Corporations: Towards Principles of Cross-Border Legal
Frameworks in a Globalized World Balancing Rights with Responsibilities.’ American University
International Law Review 23(3): 451-558.
Van Harten, Gus. 2005. ‘Private Authority and Transnational Governance: The Contours of the
International System of Investor Protection.’ Review of International Political Economy 12(4): 600-623.
Walter, Andrew. 2001. ‘NGOs, Business, and International Investment: The Multilateral Agreement on
Investment, Seattle, and Beyond.’ Global Governance 7.
14
Week X: Dispute settlement
Why, and how, are trade and investment disputes resolved? Why are there no major concerns with non-compliance?
Required:
Hoekman, Bernard, and Michel Kostecki. 2008. The Political Economy of the World Trading System,
3/E (Oxford: Oxford University Press), ch. 3
Lang, Andrew, and Joanne Scott. 2009. The hidden world of WTO governance. European Journal of
International Law 20(2) [you don’t have to read section 4 onwards].
Further reading:
Bown, Chad and Bernark Hoekman. 2005. ‘WTO Dispute Settlement and the Missing Developing
Country Cases: Engaging the Private Sector.’ Journal of International Economic Law 8:4.
Busch, Marc and Eric Reinhardt. 2000. ‘Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Early Settlement in
GATT/WTO Disputes.’ Fordham International Law Journal 24:1.
Busch, Marc. 2007. ‘Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in International
Trade.’ International Organization 61:4
Chase, Claude, Alan Yanovich, Jo-Ann Crawford, and Pamela Ugaz. Mapping of dispute settlement
mechanisms in regional trade agreements - innovative or variations on a theme?. WTO Staff Working
paper, 2013.
Davis, Christina. 2012. Why Adjudicate? Enforcing Trade Rules in the WTO. (Princeton: Princeton
University Press), ch. 2.
Davis, Christina and Yuki Shirato. 2007. ‘Firms, Governments, and WTO Adjudication: Japan’s Selection
of WTO Disputes.’ World Politics 59:2.
Goldstein, Judith, and Lisa Martin. 2000. ‘Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic Politics: A
Cautionary Note.’ International Organization 54:3.
Goldstein, Judith, and Richard Steinberg. 2008. ‘Negotiate or Litigate? Effects of WTO Judicial
Delegation on US Trade Politics.’ Law and Contemporary Problems. 71.
Kucik, Jeffrey, and Eric Reinhardt. 2008. ‘Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to the
Global Trade Regime.’ International Organization 62(3): 477-505.
Sykes, Alan. 2012. ‘The Dispute Settlement Mechanism: Ensuring Compliance.’ In: The Oxford
Handbook on the World Trade Organization (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012).
Pelc, Krzysztof. 2010. ‘Eluding Efficiency: Why do we Not See More Efficient Breach at the WTO?’
World Trade Review 9:4.
Steinberg, Richard. 2004. ‘Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political
Constraints.’ American Journal of International Law 98:2.
Weiler, Joseph. 2001. ‘The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomacy.’ Journal of World Trade 35:2.
学霸联盟
