Final Exam Details
ECON 2112: Game Theory and Business Strategy
T1, 2022

Date and Time
• Tuesday, 3rd May, during the hours of 1.30 pm - 4.30 pm (Sydney time).
• You can begin the exam at any time during these hours. However, once you begin the exam,
you will have 2 hours and 15 minutes to complete it, or until 4:30pm, whichever comes first.
Put differently, 2.15 pm, May 3 is the latest start time that ensures you get entire 2 hours and
15 minutes to complete your exam.
Exam Rules
• You have 2 hours and 15 minutes to complete the exam from the moment you begin.
• The exam will be open-book/open-notes. You can refer to any course material while you are
completing the exam.
• The exam is an individual effort. Students should not communicate, cooperate, or
collaborate with anyone else during the exam.
• You may use computational software such as Excel to calculate answers.
We expect every student to give a genuine, honest individual effort. There will be close monitoring for
evidence of collaboration, and any form of cheating will be treated as academic misconduct.
Because it is "open-book", you may also consult materials from outside the course. We do not recommend
this. Consulting outside sources will typically only take up valuable time -- the opportunity cost is high!
Further, allowed "outside sources" do not include content sharing sites and social media platforms.
Soliciting help for exam questions from other students or anyone else is considered cheating.
Technical issues
• In addition to the 2 hours allowed to complete the exam, an additional 15 minutes is allowed to
account for any minor technical issues, delays, and/or time to upload content.
• No special consideration will be granted for issues that affect your ability to complete the exam
for a period of 15 minutes or less.
• Please read the materials under the current banner “Final Exam (…)” in the Moodle site. Any
announcement regarding technical support or final exam logistics will be posted here.
• Details of what to do if you experience technical issues during the exam will be provided closer to
the exam date


Exam Format: The exam is worth 50% of overall course marks, and will consist of
• 4-5 questions – each with multiple parts
o 25-30 marks for Games of complete information (weeks 1 – 5)
o 20-25 marks for Games of incomplete information (weeks 7 - 9)
• Questions are of two types
o Multiple-choice
o Numerical response
• The exact set of questions in the exam will be different from student to student, but the content
coverage and level of difficulty will be maintained.
A note on numerical response questions: Please use decimals instead of fractions (e.g., 0.5 instead of
½, 0.33 instead of 1/3 if two decimal points is specified, 0.333 if three decimal points) unless there are
explicit instructions to the contrary. Please follow the required decimal places (for rounding) in the
question.
Exam Coverage: The exam will cover all course content, including the material from lectures, tutorials
and problem sets. Here is one way to partition the course content which might help in your study
• Static games of complete information
o Lecture: Weeks 1 and 2
o Problem Sets 1 and 2
o (Primary) Equilibrium concept: Nash equilibrium
o Focus: Identifying players, strategies, payoffs. Finding best response, Nash equilibrium in pure
and mixed strategies; checking for strictly/weakly dominated strategy, admissibility
• Dynamic games of complete information including Repeated Games
o Lecture: Weeks 3 – 5
o Problem Sets 3 and 4
o Backwards induction
o New equilibrium concept introduced: Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE)
o Repeated Games – Finitely repeated as well as infinitely repeated games
o Focus: Identifying players, payoffs and strategies. Finding best response, Nash
equilibrium, and SPNE in extensive form games (look out for games where information
sets are not singleton, i.e., where two or more nodes are connected with dotted line)
• Static games of incomplete information
o Lecture: Weeks 7 and 8
o Problem Sets 5 and 6
o New equilibrium concept introduced – Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE),
o Focus: Identifying players, types, actions, strategies, payoffs. Finding best response, Bayes-
Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies; check for both cases – one player’s type is
private information (e.g., PS 6); both players’ types are private information (e.g., PS 5)
• Dynamic games of incomplete information
o Lecture: Week 9
o New equilibrium concept introduced – Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE)
o Focus: Understanding Beliefs, Consistency, Sequential rationality – in addition to everything
specified under Static Games of Incomplete Information. Finding and verifying PBE (PS 6) –
see the examples worked out, and examples plus end-of-chapter exercises in Gibbons (ones
that ask about PBE in pure strategies).

myExperience surveys:
We value your feedback. We hope that this course has been rewarding learning experience.
If it has been, we would greatly appreciate you letting the University know by indicating that in your
response to my Experience survey.
We also want to know how we can make the experience better for future students, and your feedback
(especially the written feedback) is invaluable for this. So, whether you loved the course or have great ideas
for improvement, we want to hear from you!
Finally,
We want to say thank you.
I hope you have enjoyed learning Game Theory as much as we – Ben, Ed, Long, Rob, and I - have enjoyed
teaching it. We have learned too from your thoughtful questions and well-crafted problem set answers.
Best of luck to everyone on the exam!