ECON 2112. PROBLEM SET 2: SOLUTIONS
(1) (b)
(2) (c) Just notice that if every player votes for B a unilateral deviation cannot change the outcome
of the election. (Of course, in this Nash equilibrium every voter is using a weakly dominated
strategy.)
(3) (e)
(4) (b)
(5) (a)
(6) (b) We solved this in one of the lectures.
(7) (c) (Also there is a typo in answer (e). It should read “(B, L) can never be a Nash equilibrium”.)
(8) (a)
(9) (a)
(10) (d)
(11) (d)
(12) (d)
(13) (d) The eldest son will propose a division of $98 to himself, $0 for sons 2 and 4, and $1 for
sons 3 and 5.
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